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By means of laboratory experiment I examine the relation between
fairness judgments made `behind the veil of ignorane' and atual behavior
in a model situation of inome inequality. As the evidene shows, when
material self-interest is at stake vast majority of subjets tends to abandon
the fairness norm. Rather small regard for eieny is present in the data.
Furthermore, as low inome players go through a sequene of games against
high earners and experiene hanges in inome disparity, the history eet
proves to override strutural harateristis of the redistribution game.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s, 89.65.Gh
1. Introdution
For good or for ill, inome redistribution is one of the key funtions
assumed by modern governments. The underlying motive for it, as it is
prevalently professed, is either a sympathy for the plight of the destitute,
or a need to urtail the unjustiable inequalities though, to be sure, it is
far from ommon agreement what a justiable division of inome atually
amounts to. To make matters all the more harder to analyze and judge,
redistribution takes on so diverse forms that in some ases it may be nigh
impossible to determine the net eet of inome transfers. To give just one
example, state-naned higher eduation, for a big part of it, is a vehile
for transfering funds from lower to higher inome families [1, 2℄. Now the
aim of this paper is not to disentangle all the intriaies of the redistributive
mahinery but rather to srutinize the link between fairness judgments about
inome division and atual behavior in model situation of inome disparity
under ontrollable onditions of laboratory experiment. In doing so, I follow
∗
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the ever widening path of researh on inome redistribution onduted under
the general heading of bargaining games in experimental eonomis (see
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7℄). Readers interested in theoretial analysis of the phenomenon
are referred to [8℄ and partiularly [2℄.
The basis for this paper is the experiment I onduted in May 2005.
The experiment onsisted of two parts, pretest and experimental proper.
All in all, 84 students partiipated in the rst ommon meeting, and of
this number 72 proeeded to subsequent experimental sessions. In total 12
six-person sessions were held and eah subjet partiipated in one.
The aim of the rst ommon meeting was twofold. First, all partiipants
were requested to ll a questionnaire on eonomi and politial issues, as well
as they were asked to make ertain deisions dealing with division of money.
Seond, they were to earn money by performing tasks assigned to them. As
I ventured on a study of redistributive behavior and its relation to fairness
judgments, it was ruial that subjets' initial payos were earned in suh
a way as to make the evaluation of fair distribution possible. I took pains
to ensure that 1) task would be reasonably easy to perform yet 2) require
various degrees of eort; 3) performane ould be expliitly measured, and
4) subjets should be able to assess their eort's worth. It is espeially
unommon in vast experimental literature that ondition 4 is met. The usual
way to endow human subjets with initial inomes in all sorts of bargaining
games is either by random rule, or aording to persons' sores on some
kind of a test. In former ase payos result from sheer luk, either good
or bad. In latter ase one may attribute them to subjets' performanes
yet it is at best unlear why partiular payo sheme should be employed,
whih leaves muh room for subjets' uneliited disapproval of a sheme
atually enfored by the researher. In my experiment gainful task onsisted
in deoding one, two or four xed-size fragments of Chronia Polonorum by
Gall the Anonym (in its Polish translation, to be sure). Enryption method
was a straightforward injetion from the harater set to a set of speial
symbols or ideograms, and a suitable `ditionary' was provided at the top of
eah sheet. Partiipants' evaluation of task's worth was eliited by means
of `request for quotation' tehnique, i. e. all subjets were requested to
quote, independently and in seret, their pries for deoding one, two and
four sheets, and the lowest quoters were to get extra jobs for pries they
named. As a matter of fat, 92% of the `full-time' subjets quoted pries
below the ones atually implemented and thus we may onlude that, save 6
exeptions out of 72, subjets had no intrinsi reason to be dissatised with
initial payos they earned.
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2. Deisions behind the veil of ignorane
Before eah experimental subjet atually learned whether he was to de-
ode one, two or four sheets, as well as before he was told that a reompense
for deoding eah single sheet was 15 PLN, he had been requested to do the
following:
Consider three persons, of whom Person A solved one sheet, Person B solved
two sheets, and Person C solved four sheets. Suppose you have a total of
105 PLN to distribute among these three persons. How muh would you
pay to A, B and C respetively?
As subjets were yet unaware of their own inome positions, their judgments
were not marred by self-interested onsiderations and we may regard them
as indiative of their true justie preferenes. Sine atual payos were xed
at a pieework basis it was important whether subjetive fairness norms also
posited a proportional 15-30-60 PLN division, and if not, what kind of bias
they showed. In order to grasp it, I represented payo sale as a weightless
seond-lass lever of length 4 held in equilibrium by vertial fore applied at
the end of it. Amounts of work (1, 2, 4) were rendered as points on the lever
arm at distanes 1, 2, and 4 from the fulrum respetively, and orresponding
`fair' payos were represented as loads attahed to the arm at those points.
The proportionality (pi) of a given fair payo vetor was then dened as the
ratio between the moments of fore around the fulrum produed by `fair
loading' and `proportional loading' (the latter quantity being 1 × 15 + 2 ×
30 + 4 × 60 = 315 units). To be sure, proportional fairness produes pi=1
whereas every transfer from lower to higher inome person inreases value
of pi and vie versa. As the results show, pieework solution (pi = 1) is a
single self-evident fairness rule, supported by 42 out of 72 `full-time' subjets
(58%)
1
. Other hoies go both ways reahing minimum at .92 (for 20-35-
50 division) and maximum at 1.11 (for 10-20-75). We dare say that atual
support for proportionality ould be even higher, had the total disposable
lump sum been set at eg. 70 PLN thus making proportional division (10-20-
40) somewhat more onspiuous for non-mathematially oriented subjets.
After making their hoies on 105 PLN division, subjets were told what
was the atual prie for deoding eah single sheet and they were asked to
open envelopes (handed out to them at the very beginning) in whih they
were to nd either one, or two, or four sheets of text to be derypted on
the spot. It was also made lear to the partiipants that all payments (15
PLN show-up fee inluded) should be realized only at the end of eah of the
forthoming experimental sessions.
1
Of ourse other payo vetors, e.g. 17-27-61 PLN, may yield pi = 1 as well but it was
not the ase with our subjets.
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3. The redistribution game
3.1. Stage game
Redistribution game involves two players with unequal initial inomes
2
.
For onveniene sake from now on I will refer to the players as H and L (H for
high and L for low inome). Game onsists of two onseutive parts. First,
both members of the `dyad soiety' are to demoratially establish the rate of
redistributive inome tax whih benets L at the expense of H. Eetive tax
rate is an average of the rates simultaneously and independently proposed by
both players and may be anything from 0 to 100%. However, sal transfer
entails exeutive ost dened as a perentage of total tax revenues and thus
sal redistribution always leads to eieny loss. To present redistributive
tax mehanism formally, let us denote players' initial payos as pH and pL,
their tax votes as tH and tL, and the sal ost as C. Players' after-tax
payos are then given by the following formula:
p′i(T ) = (1− T )pi + T (1− C)p¯
where T = 1
2
(tH + tL) and p¯ =
1
2
(pH + pL). As one may easily alulate,
H suers from any positive taxation, while L benets i his initial payo is
small enough, viz. pL < (1 − C)p¯. In my experiment three types of `dyad
soieties' were formed, depending on subjets' earnings, namely: 30-15 PLN,
60-30 PLN, and 60-15 PLN, and there were two possible levels of exeutive
ost: 10 or 30%. Under any of these onditions, player L benets from the
operation of tax mehanism. Obviously, as far as strit material interest
is onerned, optimal deision is for L to vote 100% and for H to vote 0%
whih results in 50% tax rate. Thus tax system may also be pereived as a
tool with whih L may take over some part of H's initial inome, while at
the same time part of H's inome is lost due to exeutive ost. L's gain and
H's harm from 50% tax redistribution for eah ombination of the type of
dyad and the ost level atualized in the experiment are presented in Table
1. The eieny of sal transfer, or a portion of money taken from H by
means of tax system whih nds its way to L, is given by τL/τH .
After sal transfers have been realized, players have an option to pass
some portion of their after-tax inome to eah other (again, deisions are
taken simultaneously with no ommuniation between players). These vol-
untary transfers are ostless as there is no need to employ resoures to fore
2
Players' initial inomes ould also be equal but then there would be no inentive for
any redistribution whatsoever. The game ould also be easily transformed to inlude
more than two players, though in our experiment we employed only its two-person
version. For a detailed analysis of innitely repeated two-person redistribution game
see my artile [9℄.
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Type of dyad 30-15 PLN 60-30 PLN 60-15 PLN
Fisal Cost 10% 30% 10% 30% 10% 30%
L's gain at 50% tax [τL℄ 2.63 .38 5.25 .75 9.38 5.63
H's harm at 50% tax [τH ℄ 4.88 7.13 9.75 14.25 13.13 16.88
Eieny of tax transfer 54% 5% 54% 5% 71% 33%
Table 1. Strutural harateristis of the experimental games
Values in ells are nal
payos p′′L, p
′′
H
gH
γH 0
tL
0 pL + γH , pH − γH pL, pH
1 pL + τL + γH , pH − τH − γH pL + τL, pH − τH
Table 2. Normal form of dyhotomized redistribution game
anyone to do what one is willing to do on one's own. Now the nal payos
from the game are:
p′′i (T ) = p
′
i − gi + gj
where gi is the lump sum given by player i to player j.
Let τL = p
′
L(
1
2
)−pL be the amount that L is apable of taking over from H
by voting tL = 1 and thus boosting tax rate to
1
2
, and let τH = pH − p
′
H(
1
2
)
be the amount lost by H as a onsequene. To see dilemmati nature of
the game, suppose H onsiders a free transfer to L, gH = γH , suh that
τL < γH < τH while L hooses between tax vote of 0 and 1.
As Table 2 reveals, both players have dominant strategies: for L it is
to vote tL = 1, while for H it is to donate nothing, gH = 0. Both players,
however, should be better o if L voted tL = 0 and H donated gH = γH .
This feature of the redistribution game makes it a semblane of asymmetri
ontinuous prisoner's dilemma.
3.2. Experimental proedure
All in all, 12 experimental sessions were held, eah of them inluding six
subjets: two low earners of 15 PLN (S1), two medium earners of 30 PLN
(S2), and two high earners of 60 PLN (S4)
3
. After having been aquainted
with the workings of redistributive tax mehanism, subjets underwent a
four-round trial game, and then proeeded to four `real' twelve-round games
(single round being the stage game desribed in the previous paragraph).
Subjets' initial inomes at the beginning of eah round were equal to what
3
Total size of a single group had to be limited for tehnial reasons.
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they had earned during the pre-experimental meeting. To be sure, S1s in all
their games oupied L position, S4s were in H position all the time, while
S2s were in H position when playing against S1, and in L position when
playing against S4.
All games were played in loal omputer network and subjets ould not
ommuniate with eah other, exept they were being informed on a urrent
basis about deisions made by the other player
4
. All the time they also had
in view gradually updated history panel with data on their own as well as
their partner's tax votes, after-tax inomes, free transfers and resulting nal
inomes for eah ompleted round. It was made expliitly known to the
subjets that their ultimate payo from the experiment (in ash) would be
an average over all rounds' nal payos so eah deision they were to make
would bear nanial onsequenes both for them and their partners.
Eah subjet played four 12-round redistribution games, going through
all four partner-ost ongurations. Depending on order of partners and
order of sal osts, there were four possible histories for eah type of player.
By way of example, low inome player's history of games ould be one of
the following (sal ost in parentheses):
1. [S1-S4 (10%) → S1-S4 (30%)℄ → [S1-S2 (10%) → S1-S2 (30%)℄
2. [S1-S4 (30%) → S1-S4 (10%)℄ → [S1-S2 (30%) → S1-S2 (10%)℄
3. [S1-S2 (10%) → S1-S2 (30%)℄ → [S1-S4 (10%) → S1-S4 (30%)℄
4. [S1-S2 (30%) → S1-S2 (10%)℄ → [S1-S4 (30%) → S1-S4 (10%)℄
Thus subjet's partners, aording to their inome levels, were ordered either
deendingly (histories 1 or 2) or asendingly (histories 3 or 4). The same
is the ase with the ost order within the doubleheaders
5
: subjets with
history 1 or 3 experiened growing ost, while subjets with history 2 or 4
experiened diminishing ost. Important feature of this sheme is that S1-S4
(as well as S1-S2) games are played under two muh dierent irumstanes.
In history onditions 1 and 2, we have inexperiened S1 mathed with equally
inexperiened S4. However, in history onditions 3 and 4, when it omes
to S1-S4 doubleheader, S1 has already had experiene of playing against
S2 in rst two gamesand the same holds true for S4 who has already
been playing against S2 in his rst two games. In this manner, we may
examine the impat of history on redistributive behavior. Mutatis mutandis,
all things said above apply to medium and high earners as well.
4
Program was waiting until both subjets made their deisions and only then their
hoies were revealed to eah other.
5
There was no hange of partners within the doubleheader, though subjets were not
informed that they played two onseutive games against the same person. In the
listing above, the-same-partner games are rendered by means of square brakets.
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Type of dyad 30-15 PLN 60-30 PLN 60-15 PLN
Fisal Cost 10% 30% 10% 30% 10% 30%
Higher earner's mean tax vote (%) 1.33 2.22 1.77 1.79 4.43 5.12
Lower earner's mean tax vote (%) 56.73 40.92 58.82 53.99 78.55 74.79
Higher earner's nal inome (PLN) 26.80 26.29 51.91 49.72 48.76 46.21
Lower earner's nal inome (PLN) 16.90 15.80 35.36 32.76 23.14 19.80
Mean free transfer from H to L (PLN) .38 .64 2.18 2.34 .35 .30
Number of games 12 11* 12 12 11* 12
Table 3. Summary of the results from rst-partner games
* Data from one game was lost due to tehnial problems.
4. Results
4.1. Justie onsiderations
First thing to be notied in the empirial data on redistribution game is a
vast disregard for eieny manifest in mean tax votes made by lower earners
of the dyads, whih is in stark ontradition with the data one typially gets
in survey studies. Basially, respondents laim that no transfer should be
made if the eieny loss exeeds 20-30% [7℄. Now if you reall Table 1, the
most eient game in our set was 60-15 PLN under 10% sal ost, and in
this very ase eieny loss amounted to no less than 29%. In all other ases
transfers were even less eient, with extreme at 60-30 PLN and 30-15 PLN
under 30% sal ost, in whih outrageous 95% of the transfer was bound
to be lost. Now subjets' atual behavior in redistribution game amply
demonstrates the dierene between `heap talk' and deisions made when
one's monetary interest is at stake. Table 3 shows mean tax votes, nal
inomes and free transfers from H to L (orreted for the amount L sent
bak) obtained in the rst two games, viz. before the hange of partners
took plae.
Of the three types of dyads, only in 30-15 PLN ondition there was a
signiant impat of sal ost on L's voting behaviorunder heavier ost
his tax laim was lesser by 16 perentage points (Wiloxon's mathed-pairs
signed-ranks test, p=0.042). Still, even here under the extremely ineient
30% sal ost, meaning that only 1 grosz nds its way to the low-inome
voter out of every 20 taken from the high earner, L's average tax vote ex-
eeded 40%. It is also to be noted that where tax transfers are extremely
ineient (30-15 and 60-30 PLN dyads under 30% ost) one may expet free
transfers from H to ontribute more to L's welfare than tax redistribution
does. Indeed, in the 30-15 dyads low earners ultimately inreased their pay-
o by 0.80 PLN (from initial 15.00 to 15.80) but lion's share of that inrease,
0.64 PLN, was due to free transfers on part of the `rih'. And it is quite
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similar with 60-30 dyads in whih 2.34 out of 2.76 PLN inrease ame from
H, leaving only 0.42 PLN for workings of the tax system.
Certainly, it is also a learly evident trait in the data that larger relative
inome disparity makes the appetite for redistribution harder to resist. In
60-15 PLN dyad, mean tax vote by L was at least 20 perentage points
higher than in the other two types of dyads. This is true both for 10 and
30% sal ost, though only under 30% ost the dierene turns out to be
statistially signiant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p=0.03).
However ineient subjets' hoies might have been, they might have
still reeted their a priori distributive justie preferenes. As far as L's
hoies are onerned, they might have aeted H's payos in two ways:
diminish them by positive tax vote and/or inrease them by means of a free
transfer. What we are going to do now is alulate what H's nal payo
would be if it depended solely upon L's deisions (i.e. if H had not redued
his own payo either by a non-zero tax vote, or by a non-zero free transfer).
Then we should ompare the resulting sum with L's beliefs, eliited behind
the veil of ignorane, on what his opponent's fair payo should be.
Suppose there was enough money to defray `fair' payos for both of them
while H's `fair' payo did not exeed his atual initial inome. The former
ondition guarantees that in order to abide H's `fair' payo, L did not have
to give up a bit of his own `fair' payo, while the latter ondition ensures
that following L's fairness rule demanded of him no more than preserving
status quo. As a matter of fat, was H's `fair' payo smaller than his initial
inome in the game, fairness rule would even allow a ertain dose of tax
redistribution. Under suh irumstanes, if L's ations had driven his part-
ner's payo below the 'fair' level, then it would learly indiate that some
other onsiderations, be it self-interest or envy, have been at work here that
ultimately turned out to override any regard for fairness. Now in 29 out of
total 35 games that were played as rst in a series of four, the sum of initial
inomes was atually greater or equal to the sum of L's and H's `fair' payos
as pereived by L, and in none of these games H's `fair' payo exeeded his
initial inome. As results show, in 23 out of those 29 games subjets in L
position (79%) violated their own fairness rules. In 60-15 PLN dyads, whih
oered strongest material inentives for L to exploit tax system, majority
of low earners went as far as diminishing H's `fair' payo by more than 10
PLN.
4.2. History eet
In previous paragraph we analyzed only rst-partner games. Let us now
examine how rst-partner experiene aeted voting behavior of 15 PLN
earners in their seond-partner games. When we onsider all 15-60 games,
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half of them was played with no experiene at all, and half of them was
played after both L and H had already played a doubleheader against 30
PLN earners. Similarly, half of all 15-30 games were played by inexperiened
subjets, while the other half was played by subjets who had already been
through a doubleheader vs. 60 PLN earners. Now, as the evidene shows,
impat of history is virtually overwhelming.
Figure 1. Impat of history on low earner's tax voting
In rst-partner games, as it was mentioned before, larger inome dis-
parity resulted in low earners's greater demand for tax redistribution, and
it was espeially visible under 30% sal ost. Now the results from the
seond-partner games are in striking ontrast to this: appetite for redistri-
bution grows substantially in 15-30 games and it lessens in 15-60 games so
that eventually the relation between inome disparity and demand for sal
redistribution is reversed. A plausible explanation of the phenomenon is
that in terms of inertia present in soial systems. In spite of a signiant
hange in environment, subjets tended to inherit, to some extent, their be-
havior from before the hange. Low earners who played their rst two games
against subjets four times riher than themselves learned that aggressive
tax voting pays o and their moral relutane to exploit the better-o party,
if any relutane they had indeed, must have been weakened. Thus when in
the last two games they were onfronted with subjets merely twie riher,
it was relatively easier for them to forego fairness onsiderations and at on
their self-interest. The reverse is true in ase of low inome players whose
rst experiene was with 30 PLN earners: it was neither so beneial to
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indulge in tax redistribution, nor it seemed so muh justied to exploit sub-
jets whose initial inome was medium rather than high. In this manner
low earners, so to say, learned to ontain their appetite for redistribution at
the expense of the riher party, and it was relatively easier for them to stik
to the fairness rule one they ame up against 60 PLN Croesus. However
plausible this a posteriori explanation may seem, it is still surprising that
the history eet was so powerful as to ompletely override the inentives
inherent in the struture of the games.
5. Conluding remarks
The outright dominane of self interest over a priori justie onsiderations
is readily observable in the ontrast between hoies made behind the veil
of ignorane and those made in the ourse of the game. Subjets in lower
inome position were taking advantage of redistributive sal mehanism
even in fae of the gravest eieny loss. It is a rather sorry information
for those who would like to infer people's attitudes towards tax system from
their responses to survey questions.
As far as dynamis of redistribution are onerned, we may sketh two
broad onlusions. First, substantial amount of inertia is present in soial
system, and one should not expet immediate shift in behavioral patterns
even under heavy strutural hange. Seondas risky as real-life general-
izations made on the basis of a ontrolled laboratory experiment may beit
seems that while in soieties with growing inome inequalities onstituen-
ies may for some time stik to moderate redistribution typial for earlier
periods, in soieties where stark inequalities exist it may hardly be expeted
that inome equalization should lead to derease in atual demand for re-
distribution.
The researh and writing of this paper has been naned by the Polish
Ministry of Eduation and Siene as a part of the projet 1 H02E 046 28.
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